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CUSTOM AND THE RULE OF LAW IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INCOME TAX
LAWRENCE ZELENAK†
ABSTRACT
From the early years of the federal income tax to the present, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has engaged in what might be termed
“customary deviations” from the dictates of the Internal Revenue
Code, always in a taxpayer-favorable direction. A prominent current
example is the IRS’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy with respect to
employee-retained frequent flier miles; in a 2002 announcement
(which, as of 2012, is still in force), the IRS indicated that such miles
were technically within the scope of the statutory definition of gross
income, but that the IRS had no intention of enforcing the law. This
Essay describes and evaluates the phenomenon of administrativelycreated customary deviations from the Code. After defining the
concept of customary deviations and explaining why such deviations
are sometimes attractive to tax administrators, the Essay offers a brief
historical survey of customary deviations, paying particular attention
to the pre-1984 treatment of a miscellany of fringe benefits of
employment, and to a spate of recent announcements that the IRS
would not enforce the Code’s anti-loss-trafficking rules in certain
contexts. The Essay also explains how the development of customary
deviations has depended on the absence of third-party standing in tax
litigation, and how the lack of any judicial check on unauthorized
giveaways by tax administrators threatens rule-of-law values. It
concludes with a proposal for legislation aimed at retaining the
practical advantages of customary deviations while assuaging rule-oflaw concerns.
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INTRODUCTION
A recurring theme in discussions of the relationship between
custom and the law is the tension between the practical advantages of
1
custom and the threat custom may pose to rule-of-law values. This
Essay considers how that tension has played out over almost a
century of administration of the federal income tax. It begins with a
prominent example of the conflict between tax law and custom.
The attorneys in the Chief Counsel’s Office of the Internal
Revenue Service’s (IRS) who are charged with writing private letter
rulings and other forms of unpublished guidance usually labor in
obscurity—but not when the taxation of frequent-flier miles is at
issue. A story published in the Wall Street Journal on November 28,
2
1995, explained that an IRS technical advice memorandum (TAM) —
which had been issued months earlier without attracting any interest
from the media—implied that business travelers had taxable income
when they were allowed to retain for personal use frequent-flier miles
3
generated by air travel paid for by their employers. According to the
Wall Street Journal, a “storm of protest [was] gathering” over the
4
implication of the TAM. In a remarkably quick response, on the
same day the story appeared in the Wall Street Journal an IRS “senior

1. For a classic statement of the tension between custom and the rule of law, see generally
Stanley Diamond, The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom, 38 SOC. RES. 42 (1971). The
tension identified by Professor Diamond, however, is somewhat different from the tension
discussed in this Essay. In Diamond’s view, “[c]ustom . . . is the modality of primitive society;
law is the instrument of civilization, of political society sanctioned by organized force.” Id. at 47.
2. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-47-001 (July 11, 1995).
3. Tom Herman, Frequent-Flier Miles May Become IRS Target, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28,
1995, at A3.
4. Id.
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spokesman” told the New York Times, “We have no particular
compliance activities geared toward the taxation of frequent flier
miles and we don’t anticipate any . . . . I want to make sure that
5
people don’t overreact.” With the storm of protest averted, taxpayers
and their employers continued not to report the value of employeeretained frequent-flier miles on Forms W-2 and 1040, and the IRS
6
continued to look the other way. All remained quiet on the frequentflier tax front until 2002, when the IRS bestirred itself to issue an
announcement affirming the status quo:
There are numerous technical and administrative issues relating to
these benefits on which no official guidance has been provided,
including issues relating to the timing and valuation of income
inclusions and the basis for identifying personal use benefits
attributable to business (or official) expenditures versus those
attributable to personal expenditures. Because of these unresolved
issues, the IRS has not pursued a tax enforcement program with
respect to promotional benefits such as frequent flyer miles.
Consistent with prior practice, the IRS will not assert that any
taxpayer has understated his federal tax liability by reason of the
receipt or personal use of frequent flyer miles or other in-kind
promotional benefits attributable to the taxpayer’s business or
official travel. Any future guidance on the taxability of these
7
benefits will be applied prospectively.

Ten years later no “future guidance” has appeared, and the de facto
tax-exempt status of employee-retained frequent-flier miles remains
8
intact.
5. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., IRS Backs Down on Frequent-Flier Miles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,
1995, at B14 (quoting Frank Keith) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. Darrell L. Oliveira, The Taxability of Frequent Flyer Credits Earned by Employees:
Why the IRS Has Remained Silent on the Issue, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 643, 643–44 (2002)
(describing continued IRS inaction through 2002).
7. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621.
8. The tax status of frequent-flier miles resurfaced early in 2012, in a nonemployment
context, when the Los Angeles Times reported that Citibank had issued Forms 1099-MISC to
persons to whom it had given frequent-flier miles as rewards for opening accounts. David
Lazarus, Tax Man Leaves Fliers up in the Air, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2012, at B1. Citibank
apparently concluded—reasonably enough—that Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621,
did not cover this situation because it discussed only “promotional benefits attributable to the
taxpayer’s business or official travel,” id. In response to a reporter’s question, an IRS
spokesperson, Michelle Eldridge, commented, “When frequent-flier miles are provided as a
premium for opening a financial account, it can be a taxable situation subject to reporting under
current law.” David Lazarus, Taxing Airline Miles Flies in the Face of Reason, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
31, 2012, at B1 (quoting Michelle Eldridge) (internal quotation marks omitted). It does not
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Despite the reference to questions of timing and valuation,
nothing in the 2002 announcement suggests any reason why such
benefits would not be included (at some time and in some amount)
within the scope of the statutory definition of “gross income” as
9
including “all income from whatever source derived.” Moreover, the
announcement does not suggest that frequent-flier miles would fit
within any statutory exclusion from gross income. To the contrary,
the announcement appears to assume the statutory taxability of
employee-retained frequent-flier miles, and the vast majority of
10
commentators have agreed with that assumption. For reasons of
administrative convenience—to avoid the timing and valuation
problems referred to in the 2002 announcement—the IRS has
decided to create a de facto, or customary, gross income exclusion,
despite the absence of any statutory authority for its position.
This Essay describes and evaluates the phenomenon of
administratively created customary deviations from the dictates of the
Internal Revenue Code. Part I defines the concept of customary
deviations, distinguishes it from several other phenomena of tax
administration (including mere underenforcement of the law and
dubious protaxpayer administrative interpretations of the Code), and
explains why customary deviations are sometimes attractive to the
Treasury and the IRS. Part II offers a brief historical survey of
customary deviations, paying particular attention to the pre-1984
treatment of a miscellany of fringe benefits of employment, and to a
spate of recent announcements that the IRS would not enforce the
11
anti-loss-trafficking rules in certain contexts. Part III explains how

appear, however, that the IRS is making any attempt to enforce the taxability of such premium
miles against customers of other (non-1099-issuing) banks. See id. (quoting an IRS
spokesperson, who noted that the taxability of benefits, such as frequent-flier miles, “depends
on the nature, value, and other facts and circumstances surrounding the particular incentive”
(quoting Eldridge) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
9. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006).
10. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, How To Tax Frequent Flyer Bonuses, 48 TAX NOTES 1301,
1302 (1990) (“This situation falls squarely under the expanded ‘inconsistent events’ formulation
of the ‘tax benefit rule’ as formulated by the Supreme Court . . . .” (quoting Hillsboro Nat’l
Bank v. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 370, 386–87 (1983))); Jonathan Barry Forman, Income Tax
Consequences of Frequent Flyer Programs, 26 TAX NOTES 742, 743–44 (1985) (arguing that
frequent-flier benefits are fringe benefits and are unlikely to be excluded as a “working
condition fringe”); Oliveira, supra note 6, at 646–47 (noting that retained frequent-flier miles
represent “a clear accession to wealth and would therefore appear taxable”); Lee A. Sheppard,
Collecting the Tax on Frequent Flyer Benefits, 59 TAX NOTES 1140, 1141 (1993) (describing a
frequent-flier benefit as a “fringe benefit taxable as compensation”).
11. See generally I.R.C. § 382 (Supp. IV 2011) (setting forth the anti-loss-trafficking rules).

ZELENAK IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

11/21/2012 4:26 PM

CUSTOM & LAW IN THE INCOME TAX

833

the development of customary deviations has depended on the
absence of third-party standing in tax litigation and how the lack of
any judicial check on unauthorized giveaways by tax administrators
threatens rule-of-law values. It also proposes legislation aimed at
retaining the practical advantages of customary deviations while
assuaging rule-of-law concerns.
I. THE WHAT AND WHY OF CUSTOMARY DEVIATIONS
As the term is used here, a customary deviation is an established
practice of the tax administrators (the IRS and the Treasury
Department) that deviates from the clear dictates of the Internal
Revenue Code. Customary deviations are always protaxpayer for the
simple reason that taxpayers could and would successfully challenge
in court any administrative attempt to deviate from the statute in an
antitaxpayer direction. Being well aware of this fact, the tax
administrators have demonstrated no interest in antitaxpayer
deviations. Sometimes no official pronouncement of any sort
discloses the existence of a customary deviation, as in the case of the
nontaxation of frequent-flier miles prior to the 1995 dustup. In other
cases, the IRS—generally after finding itself in a tight spot, sometimes
as a result of its own bungling—sends out a spokesperson or issues an
announcement to explain, quite frankly, that the IRS has no intention
of enforcing some aspect of the law. This is exemplified by the 1995
12
remarks of a “senior spokesman”
and the 2002 formal
announcement, both relating to frequent-flier miles. In still other
cases, the IRS issues a revenue ruling baldly stating, without any
explanation or analysis, that the statute does not say what it clearly
says. For example, a 1957 revenue ruling states, with no explanation
whatsoever and in conflict with the doctrine of constructive receipt,
that a game-show contestant who turns down an in-kind prize does
13
not have to include the value of the prize in gross income.
Customary deviations are distinct (albeit with some fuzziness
around the edges of the distinctions) from three other phenomena.
The first is a protaxpayer interpretation of the Code that may seem
dubious or even insupportable in terms of the literal language of the
Code, but which would almost certainly be adopted by the courts if
the IRS were to reverse its position and taxpayers were to challenge

12. Hershey, supra note 5.
13. Rev. Rul. 57-374, 1957-2 C.B. 69; see also infra text accompanying note 36.
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the new IRS position. For example, the sweeping language of I.R.C.
§ 61—“gross income means all income from whatever source
14
derived” —provides no foundation for the exclusion from gross
income of imputed income from services (that is, the value of services
one performs for oneself) and from property (that is, the rental value
of owner-occupied housing and consumer durables). The exclusion of
such benefits dates from the dawn of the income tax and is so central
to the structure of the income tax that it is inconceivable that the
courts would support an administrative effort to reverse that
15
exclusion. In contrast, the administrative exclusion of frequent-flier
miles is of relatively recent vintage and is not central to the structure
of the income tax. As a result, it is very likely that the courts would
support an IRS effort to tax employee-retained frequent-flier miles,
16
were the IRS to have a change of heart on this issue. No doubt there
are some borderline practices that could arguably be grouped either
with imputed income or with frequent-flier miles, but in most cases
the distinction is reasonably clear.
The second phenomenon is simple underenforcement of the law
without any indication (beyond the mere underenforcement) that the
IRS acquiesces in widespread noncompliance with the Code. For
example, an information-reporting provision of the Code results in
tipped restaurant employees generally reporting income equal to 8
17
percent of restaurant sales. For the most part, the IRS is content to
enforce the income tax on the tips subject to information reporting,
without making a serious effort with respect to the other half (roughly
18
speaking) of actual tip income. Despite this underenforcement, the

14. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006).
15. BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 3.03[1] (3d ed. 2002) (“These items are not exempted
from tax by specific statutory provisions, but congressional silence on the subject is clearly
tantamount to an affirmative grant of immunity.”).
16. For consideration of the possibility that what begins as a customary deviation may
acquire the force of law over time, see infra notes 37–45 and accompanying text.
17. See I.R.C. § 6053(a), (c)(3)(A), (c)(4) (2006) (providing that a food or beverage
establishment employing more than ten employees on a typical business day must, if the tipping
of employees is “customary,” allocate among employees who customarily receive tips “an
amount equal to the excess of—(i) 8 percent of the gross receipts . . . over (ii) the aggregate
amount [of tip receipts] reported by such employees to the employer”).
18. See United States v. Fior d’Italia, Inc., 536 U.S. 238, 240 (2002) (upholding the IRS
practice of assessing FICA taxes owed by a restaurant on tips unreported by its employees,
based on an estimate of aggregate tips received by all employees of the restaurant, without any
attempt by the IRS to assess income taxes against individual employees with unreported tip
income).
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unequivocal position of the IRS is that taxpayers have an obligation
to report 100 percent of their actual tip income. According to the first
19
page of the IRS publication Reporting Tip Income, “[a]ll tips you
20
receive are income and are subject to federal income tax.” This is, of
course, very different from the IRS’s announcement that it “will not
assert that any taxpayer has understated his federal tax liability by
21
reason of the receipt or personal use of frequent flyer miles,” and
from its conclusion in a revenue ruling that turned-down game-show
22
prizes are not includible in gross income.
Finally, customary deviations are distinct from mere dubious
protaxpayer interpretations of the Code by the Treasury Department
or the IRS. A dubious protaxpayer interpretation at least pays lip
service—and sometimes considerably more than lip service—to the
law on the books and purports to apply that law. As an example,
consider proposed regulations issued in 1992, which would have
extended the exclusion of I.R.C. § 101(a) for life-insurance proceeds
“paid by reason of the death of the insured” to “qualified accelerated
death benefits” that are paid by an insurer to a terminally ill insured
23
within twelve months of the expected death of the insured. Although
a prominent commentator sharply criticized the proposed regulations
24
as irreconcilable with the statutory language, the IRS Commissioner
at the time the proposed regulations were issued defended them as a
25
legitimate reading of the statute. By contrast, a customary deviation
is characterized either by the IRS simply conceding that it has no
intention to enforce the law (as with frequent-flier miles) or by the

19. I.R.S. Publ’n 531 (Feb. 23, 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p531.pdf.
20. Id. at 1.
21. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621.
22. Rev. Rul. 57-374, 1957-2 C.B. 69.
23. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.101-8, 57 Fed. Reg. 59,319, 59,320 (Dec. 15, 1992). The proposed
regulations were never finalized because the addition of § 101(g) to the Code in 1996 provided
detailed statutory rules for the exclusion of accelerated death benefits. See Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, tit. III, subtit. D, § 331, 110
Stat. 1936, 2067 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 101(g) (2006)).
24. See Lee A. Sheppard, The Goldberg Variations, or Giving Away the Store, 58 TAX
NOTES 530, 533 (1993) (“‘By reason of the death of the insured’ means what it says—death.”
(quoting I.R.C. § 101(a)(1))).
25. See id. (“‘By reason of,’ [IRS Commissioner Fred T. Goldberg] argued, does not
necessarily require that the death already have occurred.”); see also James P. Holden, Lee
Sheppard’s Grumpy Attack, 58 TAX NOTES 1130, 1131 (1993) (“[T]he section 101(a) exclusion
for payments ‘by reason of the death of the insured’ is broad enough to permit payments made
by reason of imminent death . . . .”).
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IRS stating without explanation—because no plausible explanation is
available—that the statute means what it obviously does not.
Two important commentators would disagree with this Essay’s
claim that customary deviations are distinct from mere dubious
protaxpayer interpretations of the statute. In a thoughtful recent
article, Professors Alice Abreu and Richard Greenstein offer an indepth examination of the long-standing practice of the Treasury
Department and the IRS of not enforcing the full sweep of the § 61(a)
definition of gross income, as elaborated upon by the Supreme Court
26
in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., with respect to various
27
sorts of in-kind benefits. They convincingly demonstrate that these
failures to enforce the full sweep of the statute, rather than being
instances of mere bureaucratic nonfeasance, are responses of
conscientious administrators to severe practical problems—of
valuation, liquidity, enforcement, and public understanding and
acceptance—that would surely follow from attempted full
28
enforcement. The focus of Professors Abreu and Greenstein is
limited to issues relating to the definition of gross income; in contrast
with this Essay, they do not consider other sorts of administrative
deviations from the dictates of the Internal Revenue Code.
Nevertheless, the overlap between the subject matter of their article
and the subject matter of the current Essay is great, because, as
described in Part II, most customary deviations involve in-kind
receipts and the definition of gross income.
The disagreement here is not with Professors Abreu and
Greenstein’s excellent survey of the reasons administrators are drawn
to customary deviations, but with their characterization of such
deviations not as nonenforcement of the statute, but as interpretations
of it. According to Professors Abreu and Greenstein, the statutory
definition of gross income (as glossed by Glenshaw Glass) “gives the
IRS the flexibility to navigate the shoals of social opinion regarding
income taxation, thereby . . . permitting the evolution of a concept of
income that serves . . . important values in taxation,” including “a
29
variety of noneconomic values.” This stretches beyond the breaking
26. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (describing certain benefits as
taxable because they were “accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers
have complete dominion”).
27. Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 295
(2011).
28. See id. at 333–48.
29. Id. at 300.
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point the concept of what counts as an interpretation. Nothing in the
language or legislative history of § 61, and nothing in Glenshaw Glass,
suggests (for example) that employee-retained frequent-flier miles
are not within the definition of gross income. Moreover, the IRS has
never stated that frequent-flier miles are not within the scope of § 61.
In fact, the IRS’s most significant pronouncement on the topic—its
2002 announcement—implies the opposite when it states that “the
IRS has not pursued a tax enforcement program” with respect to
frequent-flier miles and notes that “[a]ny future guidance on the
30
taxability of these benefits will be applied prospectively.” Thus, far
from claiming that its position is an interpretation of the statute, the
IRS acknowledges that it is not enforcing the law.
The same is true of a number of other customary deviations. For
example, Professors Abreu and Greenstein discuss in some detail the
evolution of the IRS’s position on the tax treatment of unsolicited
31
free samples. In a 1970 revenue ruling, the IRS stated that a
newspaper’s book reviewer realized income when he received and
32
retained an unsolicited new copy of a book from its publisher. Later
in the same year, the IRS withdrew that ruling and replaced it with a
much narrower ruling, holding only that the reviewer was required to
include the value of the book in gross income if he donated the book
33
to charity and claimed a deduction for the donation. Professors
Abreu and Greenstein characterize the second ruling as indicating
that an unsolicited free sample is not within the definition of gross
income as long as the taxpayer does not claim a deduction for
34
donating it to charity, but the ruling neither states nor implies any
such thing. It says nothing about the taxability or nontaxability of
taxpayer-retained free samples—and in fact the analytical portion of
35
the ruling suggests that taxpayer-retained samples would be taxable.
Although an informed observer could reasonably conclude from the
two 1970 revenue rulings that the IRS had decided not to enforce the

30. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621.
31. Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 27, at 313–19.
32. Rev. Rul. 70-330, 1970-1 C.B. 14.
33. See Rev. Rul. 70-498, 1970-2 C.B. 6 (holding that “the value of these [2,500 donated]
books is includible in the taxpayer’s gross income”).
34. See Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 27, at 317–18 (describing as inconsistent with
Revenue Ruling 70-498, 1970-2 C.B. 6, the IRS’s indication in a 2006 press release that “swag
bags” given to presenters at the Academy Awards ceremony were includible in gross income).
35. See Rev. Rul. 70-498, 1970-2 C.B. 6 (“It is well established that gross income is not
limited to cash received, but may also include the fair market value of property received.”).
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taxability of taxpayer-retained samples, nothing in either ruling
constitutes an IRS interpretation of the statute as not including such
samples within the scope of gross income.
In some cases it is debatable whether an IRS action constitutes
interpretation or nonenforcement. One example is the 1957 ruling on
turned-down game-show prizes, which baldly states—without the
slightest attempt to explain or justify its conclusion—that such prizes
36
are not includible in gross income. Rulings of this sort purport to be
based on the statutory definition of gross income, so they are
interpretive in a formal sense. Because of their utter failure to
explain, however, they are interpretive only in a formal sense. In
substance, they are no different from an IRS announcement that the
Code says one thing, but that the IRS will administer the Code as if it
said something else. To describe the analysis-free game-show prize
ruling as an interpretation of the Code is to collapse a distinction
worth maintaining, between a real—albeit aggressively protaxpayer—
interpretation (such as the proposed regulations on qualified
accelerated death benefits) and nonenforcement masquerading as
interpretation.
There is one more definitional question regarding customary
deviations. If a deviation is sufficiently open and notorious (so to
speak) for sufficiently long, might it thereby acquire the force of law,
in the sense that the tax administrators could not then abandon the
deviation and begin to enforce the letter of the law? If so, then
customary deviations have a limited lifespan as deviations from the
law; once they have lasted long enough, they become the law. Such a
story might be told, for example, about the nontaxation of the rental
value of owner-occupied housing. Perhaps the tax administrators
could have declared in the early years of the income tax that imputed
rental value is includible in gross income, but perhaps the courts
would not permit that today. The case law supplies no answer to the
question of whether deviations eventually become law, for the simple
reason that the Treasury Department and the IRS have never
abandoned well-established customary deviations (in the absence of
36. Rev. Rul. 57-374, 1957-2 C.B. 69. For additional analysis-free rulings, see, for example,
Revenue Ruling 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16, which held, without explanation, that a lawyer’s client
does not realize gross income when interest earned on the client’s funds held in the lawyer’s
trust account is paid to a designated tax-exempt entity pursuant to a program established by the
state supreme court, and Revenue Ruling 63-77, 1963-1 C.B. 177, which held, also without
explanation, that the reimbursement of the interview-travel expenses of a prospective employee
by a prospective employer is not includible in the gross income of the prospective employee.
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legislative change), and thus there has never been a context in which
37
the question could be litigated.
There are a few hints in the cases that customary deviations
38
might eventually acquire the force of law. In Vesco v. Commissioner,
the Tax Court held, despite the absence of any statutory authority for
not including the value of free flights for family members in an
employee’s gross income, that the taxpayer-favorable administrative
practice of the IRS “should be applied to petitioner on the same basis
39
as it is applied to other taxpayers.” This assumed, however, that the
IRS would continue to apply the customary deviation to all other
similarly situated taxpayers. The court explicitly stated that it was not
deciding whether the IRS could have abandoned the deviation as to
all taxpayers: “We do not here determine the validity of respondent’s
argument if his long-standing position were changed as to all
40
taxpayers.”
41
Zager v. Commissioner is also not quite on point on the
question of whether customary deviations eventually acquire the
force of law. The IRS claimed that the taxpayers realized gross
income as a result of interest-free loans from a corporation they
42
controlled. The IRS’s position in the litigation was contrary to a
43
long-standing administrative position. In ruling in the taxpayers’
favor, the court opined that “if change is desired, a legislative solution
44
would appear to be more appropriate than a judicial departure.”
However, the noninclusion of the value of interest-free loans had long
45
been blessed by Tax Court precedent, so the noninclusion was not a
37. The IRS did come close once. In 1978 IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz indicated that,
if Congress did not soon provide a statutory solution to the problem of taxation of a miscellany
of employee fringe benefits, he would direct his agency to begin to enforce the full scope of § 61.
Taxing Perks—If Congress Won’t, IRS’ Kurtz Will, FORBES, July 24, 1978, at 20. The threat was
never carried out, however. For developments in the taxation of fringe benefits following
Kurtz’s 1978 threat, see infra text accompanying notes 62–66.
38. Vesco v. Comm’r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 101 (1979).
39. Id. at 130.
40. Id.
41. Zager v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 1009 (1979), aff’d sub nom. Martin v. Comm’r, 649 F.2d 1133
(5th Cir. 1981).
42. Id.
43. See id. at 1012 (“[T]he Government does not dispute that its argument on the merits
represents a change of position reflected in the administration of the tax laws.”).
44. Id. at 1014; see also Epstein v. Comm’r, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 666, 667 (1982) (following
Zager on this point); Baker v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 166, 168–70 (1980) (same).
45. See Dean v. Comm’r, 35 T.C. 1083, 1090 (1961) (“We have heretofore given full force
to interest-free loans for tax purposes, holding that they result in no interest deduction for the
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mere administrative deviation (no matter how misguided the
precedent).
Of course, the absence of any cases squarely on point is a
testament to the staying power of customary deviations. As long as
the Treasury Department and the IRS never abandon wellestablished deviations, the question of whether they have the legal
power to do so will continue to be of only theoretical interest.
The above discussion concerns the basic “what” of customary
deviations. What about the “why”? A more detailed consideration of
the “why” is provided in the next Part, which describes some of the
highlights of the historical development of customary deviations. For
the moment it is enough to note, as have Professors Abreu and
Greenstein, that most customary deviations are not unprincipled
46
administrative frolics. Rather, they are ad hoc responses to serious
difficulties with applying the Code as written in certain situations.
Consider (once again) the examples of frequent-flier miles and
turned-down game-show prizes. The 2002 announcement concerning
frequent-flier miles attributes the nonenforcement policy to
numerous
unresolved
“technical
and
administrative
issues . . . , including issues relating to the timing and valuation of
income inclusions and the basis for identifying personal use benefits
attributable to business (or official) expenditures versus those
47
attributable to personal expenditures.” This is no mere fig leaf of an
explanation. As commentators have pointed out, the practical
48
problems of taxing frequent-flier miles are truly daunting. Similar
concerns underlie a number of other customary deviations.
The story behind the game-show revenue ruling is quite
different; that ruling was based more on concerns about fairness than
on concerns about administrability. It is a well-established rule that
in-kind benefits, if includible in gross income at all, are includible at
their fair-market value rather than at their subjective value to the
49
taxpayer-recipient. In the case of a nontransferable benefit, this rule

borrower, nor interest income to the lender. We think it to be equally true that an interest-free
loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower . . . .” (citations omitted)).
46. See Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 27, at 348 (describing the IRS as “tr[ying] to reach
the right result: a tax system that is equitable, efficient, and administrable”).
47. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621.
48. See supra note 10 and sources cited therein.
49. This rule is, in part, a response to the difficulty or impossibility of administering a tax
based on subjective values. See, e.g., Rooney v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 523, 528 (1987) (taxing barter
income at fair-market value rather than at the lower subjective value claimed by the taxpayer);
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leads to the possibility that the tax on the fair-market value of a prize
could be more than the taxpayer’s subjective valuation of the prize—
in effect forcing the taxpayer to pay more (in income tax) for the
prize than the value of the prize to the taxpayer. To avoid the
unfairness of that result without venturing into the uncharted waters
of subjective valuation, the IRS issued a technically insupportable
revenue ruling allowing a game-show contestant to avoid the tax by
declining the prize. Again, the customary deviation is not an
administrative frolic. Rather, it is a good-faith administrative
response to a real difficulty with strict enforcement of the Code.
II. A HIGHLY SELECTIVE HISTORICAL SURVEY OF CUSTOMARY
DEVIATIONS
From the early years of the federal income tax, most customary
deviations have been with respect to the statutory definition of gross
income. Sometimes by pronouncement and sometimes by inaction,
the tax administrators have indicated that they would act as if the
statute excluded various sorts of noncash benefits from gross income.
Customary deviations with respect to deduction provisions are not
unheard of (and a few important recent examples are described
50
below), but the statutory definition of gross income remains to this
day the most deviated-from provision. There are two explanations for
this overrepresentation of administrative exclusions from gross
income in the universe of customary deviations. First, following the
statutory dictate with respect to the inclusion of noncash benefits in
gross income is inherently challenging for the Treasury and the IRS.
Enforcement is difficult (especially when information reporting is not
51
required, as it often is not outside the employment context),
52
problems of valuation and liquidity loom large, and taxation of many
in-kind benefits may be nonintuitive and objectionable in the minds
53
of the general public. Second, and of equal importance, is the

Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(b)(1) (1989) (requiring that taxable fringe benefits be included in gross
income at their fair-market value).
50. See infra notes 70–82 and accompanying text.
51. See RICHARD SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
78 (3d ed. 2011) (describing the difficulty of enforcement where information reporting is not
required).
52. See, e.g., id. at 113–14 (discussing the valuation and liquidity problems inherent in
taxing in-kind receipts).
53. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Zelenak & Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Taxing Baseballs and Other
Found Property, 84 TAX NOTES 1299, 1299–1300 (1999) (describing the strongly negative
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difference in acceptability between administrative sins of omission
and sins of commission. A customary deviation from the definition of
gross income is a sin of omission, resulting in the absence of any entry
on the return of an affected taxpayer. A customary deviation allowing
a statutorily unauthorized deduction (or credit) is a sin of
commission, resulting in an incorrect entry on the return of an
affected taxpayer. In the former case, the lack of an affirmative act
and the literal invisibility of a nonentry result in customary exclusions
attracting much less critical attention than customary deductions (or
credits) would attract.
In the early decades of the income tax, fringe benefits of
employment were an especially rich source of customary deviations
54
from the statutory definition of gross income. Strictly speaking,
some of these deviations were not deviations at all under the
55
definition offered above, because they were expressed in official
pronouncements which offered explanations for their conclusions.
For example, in a 1920 pronouncement the Bureau of Internal
Revenue explained that occasional “supper money” paid by an
employer to an employee working late “is considered as being paid
for the convenience of the employer and for that reason does not
56
represent taxable income to the employee.” A year later, the Bureau
ruled that gross income did not include the value of free
transportation passes issued by a railroad to its employees and their
families for nonbusiness use; the passes were “considered gifts and
[so] the value thereof does not constitute taxable income to the
57
employees.”
At least from the enlightened perspective of 2012, the rationales
of both rulings are ludicrous. Nothing in the statutory definition of
gross income (then or now) suggests that amounts paid “for the

reaction of politicians—presumably inspired by their sense of public sentiment—to the
possibility that a baseball fan would realize gross income from catching a valuable recordbreaking home-run baseball).
54. The history of the taxation of fringe benefits offered here is highly selective. More
thorough accounts can be found in Wayne M. Gazur, Assessing Internal Revenue Code Section
132 After Twenty Years, 25 VA. TAX REV. 977, 980–95 (2006), and in Susan R. Finneran, Fringe
Benefits or “Condition of Employment”: Uniformity, Certainty, and Compliance, 78 NW. U. L.
REV. 198, 223–57 (1983).
55. See supra text accompanying note 14.
56. O.D. 514, 2 C.B. 90 (1920). The ruling is unusual in its exclusion of cash; the employer’s
direction that the cash be spent on food puts the “supper money” at the borderline of cash and
in-kind benefits.
57. O.D. 946, 4 C.B. 110 (1921).
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convenience of the employer” are for that reason outside the
boundaries of gross income, and the idea that the railroad passes were
gifts rather than part of an employee’s compensation package is
simply out of touch with reality. Taxpayer-favorable positions based
on dubious interpretations of the Code are legitimately
distinguishable from customary deviations, but positions based on
risible rationales shade into positions with no statutory foundation
whatsoever, and thus into the realm of customary deviations.
Although a few other deviations were also set forth in published
58
rulings, for many decades the IRS’s routine administrative practice
was not to enforce the taxation of many sorts of fringe benefits,
despite the absence of published rulings on point. As the government
admitted in its brief in a 1962 Supreme Court case, under the IRS’s
administrative
practice
fringe
benefits
were
“not
generally . . . considered income to the employees even if the
employer’s sole reason for providing them [was] to confer a benefit
upon the employees—e.g., provision of parking facilities, medical
59
services, swimming pools, libraries, courtesy discounts, etc.”
In an attempt to impose some order on the tax treatment of
miscellaneous fringe benefits (that is, fringe benefits not already
covered by a specific exclusion provision of the Code), in 1975 the
Treasury Department issued a discussion draft of proposed
regulations which would have provided at least a regulatory
foundation for some of the de facto administrative exclusions, while
60
putting an end to others. In response to criticism from all sides, the
61
Treasury Department abandoned the proposal the next year.
Congress became involved in 1978. In July of that year, IRS
Commissioner Jerome Kurtz took the rather remarkable step of
warning that, unless Congress provided a statutory basis for the
exclusion of miscellaneous fringe benefits, he would direct his agency
58. See, e.g., O. 1014, 2 C.B. 88, 89–90 (1920) (holding that employer-provided group term
life insurance was not included in the gross income of a covered employee); Rev. Rul. 59-58,
1959-1 C.B. 17, 18 (excluding from gross income the value of holiday hams and turkeys received
by employees “[i]n view of the small amounts involved, and since it may reasonably be
contended in many cases that such items constitute excludable gifts”; the latter explanation
implied that in some cases the gift characterization would not be reasonable).
59. Brief for the United States at 39, Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269 (1962) (No.
396).
60. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16(a), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118, 41,119 (Sept. 5, 1975) (listing
benefits that are included in and excluded from gross income).
61. Fringe Benefits: Withdrawal of Discussion Draft, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,334, 56,334 (Dec. 28,
1976).
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to begin enforcing the taxation of forty types of then-untaxed
62
benefits. Perhaps not coincidentally, three months later Congress
63
imposed a moratorium (which finally expired at the end of 1983,
64
after having been twice extended) on any actions by the Treasury
Department or the IRS that would alter the established nontaxation
of fringe benefits.
Following the expiration of the moratorium, in early 1984 the
IRS announced that it would replace the legislative moratorium with
65
a self-imposed version, but only through the end of 1984. Faced with
the possibility that the Treasury Department and the IRS might soon
begin enforcing I.R.C. § 61 as written, and perhaps weary of
moratorium legislation, Congress finally brought order to the taxation
66
of miscellaneous fringe benefits by enacting new § 132. The new
provision furnished a statutory basis for most of the customary
deviations that had been established for decades. At the same time,
however, Congress added a specific mention of “fringe benefits” in
§ 61(a)(1) (which lists “compensation for services” as a component of
gross income), thus indicating that there were to be no more de facto
67
administrative exclusions for fringe benefits not excluded by § 132.
As a result of the 1984 legislation, the incidence of customary
deviations in the fringe-benefit context has been greatly reduced.
(The glaring exception is the de facto exclusion of employee-retained
frequent-flier miles, if those miles are understood as received by
68
employees from their employers.) Deviations from § 61 remain

62. See Taxing Perks—If Congress Won’t, IRS’ Kurtz Will, supra note 37, at 20 (explaining
that Kurtz planned to issue whatever directives were necessary to tax fringe benefits).
63. Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 1, 92 Stat. 996, 996.
64. Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-167, § 1, 93 Stat. 1275, 1275; Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, tit. VIII, § 801, 95 Stat. 172, 349.
65. Rev. Proc. 84-14, 1984-1 C.B. 431.
66. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, div. A, tit. V, subtit. C, § 531(a), 98
Stat. 494, 877 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 132 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
67. Id. § 531(c), 98 Stat. at 884 (codified at I.R.C. § 61 (2006)).
68. The tax administration problems presented by frequent-flier miles have much in
common with the problems presented by the miscellaneous fringe benefits addressed by § 132.
Why, then, did Congress also not eliminate the frequent-flier customary exclusion in the 1984
legislation by providing a statutory basis for the exclusion? The answer seems to be that
frequent-flier programs were too recent a phenomenon in 1984 for their customary exclusion to
have become well established, and thus to have come to the attention of Congress. See Paul
Grimes, Practical Traveler: Coupons and Other Bonuses for the Airborne, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,
1981, § 10, at 3 (describing “bonus incentive plans based on the number of trips you take or
miles you fly” recently introduced by many airlines).

ZELENAK IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

CUSTOM & LAW IN THE INCOME TAX

11/21/2012 4:26 PM

845

significant, however, outside the employment setting; the previously
69
mentioned ruling on turned-down game-show prizes is one example.
Two post-1984 developments involved the expansion of
customary deviations beyond the gross-income setting. The first
development concerned the deduction for charitable contributions. In
70
the 1989 case of Hernandez v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court
upheld the IRS’s position that Scientologists were not entitled to
71
deduct the “fixed donations” charged by the Church of Scientology
for “auditing” services, on the grounds that the “payments were part
72
of a quintessential quid pro quo exchange.” The Court rejected the
taxpayers’ arguments that “purely religious” benefits should be
disregarded in the quid pro quo analysis and that the IRS
impermissibly discriminated against Scientology by denying the
charitable deduction to Scientologists while allowing deductions to
73
members of other religions in analogous circumstances. Only four
years after the Court decided Hernandez, the IRS issued an analysisfree one-sentence revenue ruling announcing that the 1978 ruling
denying a deduction for Scientology auditing payments was thereby
74
“obsoleted,” implying that the IRS would no longer challenge the
deduction claims of Scientologists. But for the Hernandez decision,
the IRS’s new protaxpayer position might have been characterized as
a debatable-on-the-merits interpretation of the statute, but in the
aftermath of the Court’s authoritative interpretation of the statute the
new position constituted a deviation—unusual for being a deviation
from a deduction provision rather than from § 61.
More recently, the tax administrators have announced deviations
of great economic significance in another setting far removed from
§ 61. Section 382 of the Code imposes strict limits on the deductibility

69. See Rev. Rul. 57-374, 1957-2 C.B. 69 (stating that when an individual refuses to accept
an all-expense-paid vacation, the value of the trip is not included in gross income); see also, e.g.,
Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16, 17 (holding that a lawyer’s client does not realize gross income
when interest earned on the client’s funds held in the lawyer’s trust account is paid to a
designated tax-exempt entity pursuant to a program established by the state supreme court);
Rev. Rul. 63-177, 1963-1 C.B. 177, 178 (holding that a prospective employer’s reimbursements
to individuals for interview expenses are not includible in gross income). All three rulings are
still in force.
70. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
71. Id. at 685.
72. Id. at 691.
73. See id. at 689–94 (discussing quid pro quo); id. at 700–03 (discussing disparate
treatment).
74. Rev. Rul. 93-73, 1993-2 C.B. 75.
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of corporate net-operating-loss carryforwards and of unrealized builtin losses, following either an acquisition of a loss corporation by
another corporation or a major change in the ownership of a loss
corporation. In September 2008, as Congress was considering a
massive bailout bill for the financial industry, the IRS of the Bush
administration made its own contribution to the bailout effort by
75
issuing Notice 2008-83, declaring—without making any attempt to
explain or justify its conclusion—that the § 382 limitations on the use
of built-in losses following an ownership change would no longer
76
apply to banks. The primary purpose of the notice appears to have
been the facilitation of the acquisition of failing Wachovia—by Wells
Fargo, as it turned out. Although the notice generated considerable
77
outrage in the media, among tax experts, and on Capitol Hill, it
achieved the desired result. Early in 2009, Congress took the highly
unusual step of enacting legislation specifically disapproving of Notice
2008-83 as “inconsistent with the congressional intent” and describing
78
the legal authority for the notice as “doubtful.” The legislation,
however, also declared that taxpayers could rely on the notice with
79
respect to ownership changes occurring before January 17, 2009.
The Obama administration followed the Bush-era precedent,
thus making protaxpayer administrative revisions of § 382 a
bipartisan activity. The Obama-era IRS issued several § 382 notices of
80
its own, including, most prominently, Notice 2010-2, which
declared—again, without apparent support from the statute—that
§ 382 would not be triggered if the Treasury Department were to sell
81
its shares of General Motors to the public. Although the notice
82
attracted some sharp criticism, it remains in effect.

75. I.R.S. Notice 2008-83, 2008-2 C.B. 905.
76. Id.
77. For a review of some of the reactions to the notice, see Lawrence Zelenak, Can
Obama’s IRS Retroactively Revoke Massive Bank Giveaway?, 122 TAX NOTES 889, 889–93
(2009).
78. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, div. B, tit. I,
subtit. C, pt. VII, § 1261(a)(2)–(3), 123 Stat. 115, 343.
79. Id. § 1261(b)(1)(A), 123 Stat. at 343.
80. I.R.S. Notice 2010-2, 2010-1 C.B. 251.
81. Id. at 252. The notice did not mention General Motors by name.
82. See, e.g., J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Can the Treasury Exempt Its Own
Companies from Tax? The $45 Billion GM NOL Carryforward, 1 CATO PAPERS ON PUB. POL’Y
1, 5 (2011) (characterizing the ruling as an unauthorized gift from the Obama administration to
the United Auto Workers).
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The recent § 382 notices should be troubling to anyone who
values the application of the rule of law to tax administration. One
can only speculate, but it is plausible that the § 382 notices never
would have been issued but for the precedent of the § 61 customary
deviations. Although the § 61 deviations are considerably easier to
defend on the merits than the § 382 notices, both the Bush and
Obama administrations may have taken the § 61 deviations to stand
for the proposition that the Treasury Department and the IRS are
always free to disregard the dictates of the Internal Revenue Code, as
long as they do so in a taxpayer-favorable direction.
Whether it is possible to combine the genuine administrative
advantages of the restrained use of customary deviations with respect
for the rule of law is considered in the next section.
III. THE ABSENCE OF THIRD-PARTY STANDING, THE SURVIVAL OF
CUSTOMARY DEVIATIONS, THE RULE OF LAW, AND A DIFFERENT
APPROACH
When the IRS signals that it is not going to enforce the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code in a particular context—be
it employee-retained frequent-flier miles or Wells Fargo’s acquisition
of Wachovia’s built-in losses—there is usually no lack of goodgovernment sorts who are offended by the IRS’s position and who
would be only too happy to challenge that position in court on behalf
83
of the public. Intermeddling law professors alone (possibly including
this one) would be sufficient to challenge most of the more significant
customary deviations. Very few such suits are brought, however, and
none succeed, because the law of standing does not permit selfappointed guardians of the public interest to challenge the IRS’s
unduly lenient treatment of other taxpayers. Concurring in 1976 in a
leading case rejecting a claim of third-party standing, Justice Stewart
remarked that he could not “imagine a case, at least outside the First
Amendment area, where a person whose own tax liability was not
affected ever could have standing to litigate the federal tax liability of
84
someone else.”

83. For expressions of dissatisfaction with those particular nonenforcement decisions, see
Dodge, supra note 10, at 1301; Ramseyer & Rasmusen supra note 82, at 5; Zelenak, supra note
77, at 889.
84. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
For additional examples of the Supreme Court denying third-party standing in tax cases, see
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 740 (1984), which involved a third-party challenge to federal
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It is conceivable that a taxpayer whose own tax liability was at
issue—and who thus clearly had standing—would want to challenge a
generally taxpayer-favorable administrative deviation from the
85
statute. Suppose, for example, a book reviewer receives free review
copies from publishers in year one, and (in keeping with the IRS’s
well-established nonenforcement policy with respect to unsolicited
86
books not later claimed as charitable deductions) does not include
the value of the books in his gross income on his income tax return
for year one. In year five the reviewer sells the copies for some
nontrivial amount. He reports no gain on the sale, claiming he has a
basis in the books equal to the value he should have reported on his
return for year one—a year which is now, conveniently enough,

income tax exemptions for racially segregated schools, and DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547
U.S. 332, 340–46 (2006), which involved third-party challenges in federal court to state and local
tax breaks.
As hinted at by Justice Stewart, special considerations apply in the First Amendment
context. Under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), one’s status as a taxpayer gives one standing
to challenge government expenditures benefitting religion as violations of the Establishment
Clause, id. at 88. Thus, under Flast one taxpayer might have had standing to challenge
statutorily unauthorized favorable IRS treatment of another taxpayer as a violation of the First
Amendment. At its broadest, this was a very narrow exception to the no-third-party-taxstanding rule, but two recent Supreme Court decisions have narrowed Flast to the point of
nonexistence in this context. In Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, 551 U.S. 587 (2007),
the Court declined to “lower[] the taxpayer standing bar to permit challenges of purely
executive actions,” id. at 611. In the immediate aftermath of Hein, it appeared that a taxpayer
would have standing to challenge the First Amendment acceptability of the statutory treatment
of another taxpayer, but not to challenge the favorable administrative treatment (in
contravention of the statute) of another taxpayer. Hein alone would have been sufficient to
deny Flast standing in any suit challenging the constitutionality of a customary deviation from
the Code. The Court limited Flast again in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 (2011), in which the Court held that tax credits (under the Arizona
state income tax) did not count as government spending, and so could not be challenged by a
third party claiming standing under Flast. Even apart from Hein, Arizona Christian School
Tuition Organization would be sufficient to deny standing to taxpayers challenging the
constitutionality of favorable IRS treatment of other taxpayers. Thus, the sort of third-party
standing hinted at by Justice Stewart in First Amendment cases now appears to be doubly
foreclosed.
85. See Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 185,
239–43 (2004) (hypothesizing a number of situations in which taxpayers might be motivated to
challenge the validity of the so-called “check-the-box” regulations governing tax classification of
entities as partnerships or corporations, despite the generally taxpayer-favorable character of
the regulations).
86. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. As explained in that text, the
nonenforcement policy may be implied by Revenue Ruling 70-498, 1970-2 C.B. 6, when read in
the context of the earlier ruling it replaced, but the IRS has never formally stated this
nonenforcement policy.
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87

closed by the three-year statute of limitations. His argument is that,
although his failure to report the value of the books in year one was
consistent with the IRS’s customary deviation from the statute, the
88
customary deviation is itself without legal foundation.
The attractiveness to taxpayers of this sort of scheme is severely
curtailed by §§ 1311 through 1314 of the Code, which provide for
“mitigation” of the statute of limitations in various situations in which
the taxpayer (or the IRS) takes a position on the tax treatment of a
transaction in an open year that is inconsistent with the treatment of a
89
related transaction in a year now closed by the statute of limitations.
In situations such as the example—in which a taxpayer claims basis
on account of an amount he should have included in gross income in a
closed year—the taxpayer is allowed the claimed basis if the
taxpayer’s position is substantively correct, but the IRS is allowed to
assess and collect the additional earlier-year tax that would be
produced by the inclusion in that year, despite the fact that the earlier
90
year is otherwise closed.
Although the mitigation provisions very often eliminate the
incentive for taxpayers to challenge protaxpayer customary
deviations in closed years to gain an advantage in later open years,
this will not always be the case. In the book-reviewer example, if the
applicable tax rate in the later year is higher than the applicable tax
rate in the earlier year, then the benefit of the additional basis in the
later year will be greater than the cost of the inclusion in the earlier
year. The reviewer would then have motivation to challenge the
protaxpayer customary deviation in the earlier year, despite the fact
that a successful challenge would bring into play the mitigation
provisions.
Despite the theoretical possibility that a taxpayer could have
motivation—and standing—to challenge the application to himself of
a taxpayer-favorable customary deviation, in practice such litigation is

87. See I.R.C. § 6501(a) (Supp. IV 2011) (providing for a three-year statute of limitations).
88. For an unsuccessful taxpayer effort along similar lines, see Woodsam Associates v.
Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 1952). In keeping with the long-standing IRS
interpretation of the statute—not a mere customary deviation—the taxpayer did not treat
nonrecourse borrowing against unrealized appreciation as a taxable event; in a later year,
however, the taxpayer claimed an increase in the basis of the mortgaged property on the
grounds that the borrowing was, in fact, a taxable event. Id. at 359.
89. I.R.C. §§ 1311–1314 (2006).
90. See id. § 1312(7) (including situations of this sort in the list of circumstances giving rise
to mitigating adjustments under § 1311).
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vanishingly rare. As a result, the prospect of such litigation has had
no discernible braking effect on the IRS’s customary-deviation
92
practices.
This Essay does not attempt to set forth a full-blown argument
that customary deviations are often appropriate or even necessary
administrative responses to the severe difficulties that would arise if
the IRS insisted on enforcing the full letter of the law in all
situations—although even my brief descriptions of the frequent-flier
mile and game-show prize issues may be enough to make the point in
93
a nonrigorous sort of way. If the point is accepted, however, it
follows that the denial of third-party standing in tax cases is a very
good thing. After all, customary deviations could not survive in their
current form under a legal regime which conferred standing upon any
third party objecting to a customary deviation benefitting other
94
taxpayers. The IRS could not, for example, suggest that employeeretained frequent-flier miles are includible in gross income under the
terms of § 61, but then indicate that it is going to act as if they were
not, and signal to taxpayers with a wink and a nod that taxpayers
should follow the IRS’s lead. Similarly, the IRS could not simply
announce—without making any attempt to reconcile its
announcement with the dictates of the statute—that it was going to
administer the § 382 restrictions on trafficking in tax losses as if that
provision contained exceptions for Wells Fargo and General Motors.

91. Woodsam is one of the few cases that might be cited as such a challenge. See Woodsam,
198 F.2d at 358–59. Strictly speaking, however, even it is not such a challenge because the
challenged protaxpayer treatment was not, in fact, a deviation from the statute. See id. at 359
(holding that the taxpayer’s borrowings “did not change the basis for the computation of gain or
loss”).
92. Even if a taxpayer were to mount a successful challenge to a particular deviation, the
litigation would likely have little or no effect on the application of the challenged deviation to
other taxpayers. If the IRS prefers not to enforce the law on the books in a particular context,
the mere existence of a judicial opinion (even if it is from the Supreme Court) does not compel
the IRS to abandon its nonenforcement policy with respect to any taxpayer other than the
taxpayer involved in the litigation. As always, the absence of third-party standing leaves the IRS
free to pursue a policy of nonenforcement. And because the effect of the nonenforcement
policy is overwhelmingly taxpayer favorable, other taxpayers will not be lining up to take
advantage of the judicial precedent.
93. For a much more ambitious—and largely successful—defense of the IRS practice of
often ignoring the letter of the law with respect to the inclusion of in-kind benefits in gross
income, see Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 27, at 299.
94. See Polsky, supra note 85, at 245 (remarking, after arguing against the validity of the
generally taxpayer-favorable check-the-box entity classification regulations, “[i]t is likely that
the restrictive taxpayer standing doctrine plays a role in the Treasury’s issuance of these invalid
rules”).
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Nor could the IRS make stick its analysis-free revenue rulings holding
that various items—turned-down game-show prizes, for example—
are not includible in gross income. In all these situations, if thirdparty standing existed courts would likely feel compelled to apply the
Code as written, giving little or no weight to the various “soft” policy
arguments in favor of the deviations.
Although the denial of third-party standing gives the Treasury
Department and the IRS the flexibility they arguably need, it creates
serious rule-of-law problems. To anyone who takes the rule of law
seriously, it is troubling to contemplate that the Treasury and the IRS
are almost unconstrained in their ability to make de facto revisions to
the Internal Revenue Code enacted by Congress, as long as those
revisions are in a taxpayer-favorable direction. It is especially
troubling to think that the relatively innocent customary deviations in
the gross income context may have bred a disrespect for the rule of
law on the part of the Treasury and the IRS, so that tax
administrators now believe they have the power and the authority to
disregard any Code section when doing so would further their notion
(not Congress’s notion) of good tax policy. The recent selective
disregardings of § 382 by the Bush and Obama administrations are
95
bad enough from a rule-of-law perspective, and may be signs of even
worse to come. It may seem, then, that the choice is between the
unsatisfactory alternatives of a system that denies crucial flexibility to
tax administrators or a system that fosters a deep disrespect for the
rule of law.
But there may be a way to preserve needed administrative
flexibility while paying more respect to rule-of-law concerns.
95. Professors Mark Ramseyer and Eric Rasmusen are particularly scathing on the rule-oflaw implications of the 2010 notice declaring (to oversimplify a bit) that § 382 did not apply to
General Motors. According to them, there would have been no substantive difference between
the actual notice and a more honest hypothetical alternative stating that President Obama “is
grateful to the UAW for the assistance it provided his party,” and that “[i]n gratitude for that
political support, the Treasury announces that” § 382 does not apply to General Motors.
Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 82, at 30.
In response to what they view as the scandal of the § 382 notices, Ramseyer and
Rasmusen propose a statute giving any two members of Congress standing to challenge any
taxpayer-favorable “arbitrary and capricious” tax administrative position, with the “arbitrary
and capricious” standard satisfied when the “statute is unambiguously contrary to the Treasury
position.” Id. at 37. The proposal has considerable merit in the context of the § 382 notices, but
Ramseyer and Rasmusen do not consider its impact outside of that context. Their proposal
would grant any two members of Congress standing to challenge (for example) the IRS
announcement that it would not enforce the taxation of frequent-flier miles, thereby denying
the IRS flexibility which is arguably appropriate or even crucial in that context.

ZELENAK IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

11/21/2012 4:26 PM

852

[Vol. 62:829

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

Congress, the Treasury Department, and the IRS could take steps to
preserve the ability of tax administrators to deviate from strict
adherence to the statute in situations in which deviations are a
reasonable response to concerns of administrability—broadly defined
to include, among other things, problems of valuation, liquidity,
timing, enforcement, and public understanding and acceptance. Given
that the large majority of customary deviations involve the
noninclusion in gross income of various types of nonemployee noncash benefits, perhaps the best approach would be for Congress to
enact a new Code provision specifically authorizing the Treasury
Department to issue regulations narrowing the statutory definition of
gross income with respect to non-cash benefits received outside of an
employment context, whenever the IRS decides that administrative
96
concerns make such a narrowing advisable. If this approach worked
well in the gross-income context, Congress might decide to give the
Treasury Department similar authority to revise by regulation other
specified Code sections—although it is hard to imagine that Congress
would ever decide that it was appropriate (for example) to give
Treasury the authority to “turn off” § 382 for certain taxpayers.
Armed with an explicit grant of authority, the Treasury
Department could replace its unacknowledged deviations, its
announcements that it will not enforce the law, and its analysis-free
revenue rulings with what would then be clearly authorized
regulations narrowing the scope of gross income—and perhaps other
clearly authorized regulations revising other Code sections pursuant
to other express grants of authority. Needed administrative flexibility
would be maintained, and respect for the rule of law would be
enhanced. No longer would a de facto administrative exclusion for
frequent-flier miles foster an administrative mindset in which the
Treasury Department feels free to issue notices conferring billions of
dollars of unauthorized tax benefits on a small number of clearly
identifiable taxpayers.

96. Such a provision would not unambiguously confer on the Treasury Department
authority to issue regulations excluding from gross income employee-retained frequent-flier
miles, since the miles are at least arguably received by employees from their employers (on the
view that there is a constructive transfer of the miles from employer to employee when the
employer allows the employee to retain the miles rather than declining them or turning them
over to the employer). In any event, the question of the tax status of frequent-flier miles is
sufficiently high profile and of sufficient economic importance that Congress should probably
resolve it by statute (following the 1984 precedent of the miscellaneous fringe benefit rules, see
supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text) rather than leaving it to administrative discretion.
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An alternative approach, suggested by Commissioner Kurtz’s
1978 threat to start enforcing the letter of the law with respect to
97
fringe benefits, would be for the tax administrators to notify
Congress that a statutorily unauthorized customary deviation has
been identified, and that unless Congress quickly provides a statutory
foundation for the current practice, the administrators intend to end
the deviation and start enforcing the law on the books at a specified
date in the fairly near future. Even if this game of chicken happened
98
to work in the case of Kurtz’s threat, it is not satisfactory as a general
solution. First, it could never be truly institutionalized, because each
succeeding administration would be free to use or not use this
approach. Second, in many cases a reasonable date to begin enforcing
the law on the books would be after the departure of the current
administration, in which case the threat could not credibly be made.
Third, if the reason for the existence of the deviation is the extreme
unworkability of strict enforcement (as is arguably the case with
frequent-flier miles), then the threat of full enforcement might not be
credible even apart from concerns about the life expectancy of the
current administration. Finally, even if the threat is credible, the
political barriers to the enactment of tax legislation—even of
noncontroversial provisions—are sometimes so high that the threat
may fail to produce a legislative solution despite overwhelming
congressional sentiment in favor of a solution. Because none of these
objections apply to the alternative approach of a statutory grant of
authority to the Treasury Department to issue deviating regulations,
the statutory authority approach is preferable to the game-of-chicken
strategy.
CONCLUSION
Customary deviations from the statute in the administration of
the federal income tax have existed almost as long as there has been a
federal income tax. Especially in the administration of the definition
of gross income, there are strong arguments of administrative
convenience—or even necessity—in favor of many of the deviations.
Although such deviations have always been in tension with the rule of
law, that tension may have been tolerable as long as tax
97. Taxing Perks—If Congress Won’t, IRS’ Kurtz Will, supra note 37, at 20.
98. The enactment of § 132 followed six years after the threat. Deficit Reduction Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 531(a), div. A, tit. V, subtit. C, 98 Stat. 494, 877 (codified as amended
at I.R.C. § 132 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). But it is not clear that the threat caused the enactment.
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administrators exercised self-restraint in their use of customary
deviations. The recent bipartisan extension of deviations to the losstrafficking context suggests a serious eroding of administrative selfrestraint and a greater threat to the rule of law. The time may have
come for Congress to intervene by providing explicit statutory
authorization for some deviations (primarily or exclusively deviations
relating to the definition of gross income) while making clear the
unacceptability of deviations in other contexts.
It is a commonplace that nonenforcement (or severe
underenforcement) of one law may breed among the citizenry a
general disrespect for the law. That was, for example, one of the
99
standard critiques of the underenforcement of Prohibition laws, and
it is today a common Tea Party critique of the Obama
100
administration’s allegedly lax enforcement of the immigration laws.
This is also a concern in the tax context; for example, the ability of
tipped workers to avoid paying tax on a substantial portion of their
101
tips may contribute to a general decline in voluntary compliance.
The customary deviations discussed in this Essay, however, raise
a different concern. Because the taxpaying public may not understand
that customary deviations are contrary to law—for example, most
taxpayers may assume that the Code excludes frequent-flier miles
from gross income—customary deviations may do little or nothing to
foster a general disrespect for the income tax among the citizenry.
The mischief of customary deviations is in their effect on the tax
administrators. As the example of the recent § 382 announcements
suggests, customary deviations may have contributed to an
insufficient respect for the dictates of the Code on the part of highlevel Treasury Department and IRS officials. Although this Essay has
considered only customary deviations in the administration of the
federal income tax, scholars of other federal agencies—the SEC and
the EPA come readily to mind—might profitably investigate whether

99. See, e.g., DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION 316
(2010) (describing and quoting President Herbert Hoover’s inaugural address, in which Hoover
stated that underenforcement of Prohibition laws by state and local authorities was
“destroy[ing] respect for all law”).
100. See, e.g., Alberto R. Gonzales, “Anchor Babies” Aren’t the Problem with Immigration,
WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2010, at B2 (claiming that the Obama administration had failed to
enforce the immigration laws and that this failure “breeds . . . disrespect for the rule of law”).
101. See, e.g., SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra note 51, at 52 (“[T]he existence of
unenforced rules may foster a general disrespect for the tax system, and thus encourage
cheating not only with respect to tips but whenever cheating is not likely to be detected.”).
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customary deviations play a similar role—and raise similar
concerns—in the practices of those agencies.

